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 Abstract 
This dissertation is written as a part of the MSc in e-Business and Digital Market-
ing at the International Hellenic University. 
By this Master Thesis, we conduct an analysis for one of the most important issues 
that our society faces during the last years, misinformation. Misinformation is not 
a totally new concept, however, in the recent past, it has become a major topic for 
discussion and gained the attention of the research community since it spreads 
through the internet globally. Misinformation has become an important problem 
that our society faces during the last years aiming mostly at political interference. 
This thesis investigates the concept of misinformation with the European Elections 
(EU) 2019 as a case study. First, we explore the Code of Practices published by 
the European Commission to address the spread of online misinformation and its 
compliance status with online platforms, leading social networks, and the adver-
tising industry. Second, we analyze the social media profiles of main political fig-
ures in the elections in terms of misinformation. Finally, we investigate the previ-
ously fact-checked articles related to EU elections 2019 by using state-of-the-art 
and open-source fact-checking tools. We employ open source free tools.  
This Master Thesis based on the proposed roadmap is accomplished under the su-
pervision and kind guidance of Dr. Vasilios Peristeras, assistant Professor at the 
International Hellenic University, School of Science and Technology and other 
people in the university who help me as well.   
 
 
 
Alexandros Tsakalidis 
02/12/2019 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last years, misinformation has arisen in various formats and different aspects of 
society. The rapid spread of misinformation can influence millions of people, impacting 
elections and financial markets. Misinformation is seen as a serious problem across the 
globe including Europe. To curb the rising influence of misinformation, some countries 
have made the creation and distribution of deliberately false information as a crime (133). 
They have also established national laws to tackle misinformation. However, simply pass-
ing a law against misinformation may not be the best way to deal with the problem. Such 
laws create a dilemma balancing free speech and access to accurate information in the era 
of misinformation. There is no doubt that modern technologies have accelerated the speed 
at which fake news spread. Technology has made lying easier, faster and more credible 
(133). 
In the literature, the term information is the solution of uncertainty and it is based on real 
and truthful facts, while misinformation is a term -used for unreal information- which 
mainly refers to information that is not accurate and valid (7). On the other hand, disin-
formation is presented as false information which is spread with the intention to deceive 
its recipients. Thus, it is important to categorize those 2 terms not as synonyms -as many 
people believe- but as 2 separate entities. (28) 
Fake news has become a trait of our generation. Fake news is inaccurate or false infor-
mation, however, there is no clear separation whether it is intended or not, to deceive the 
recipients (48, 49). Many types of fake news exist, though propaganda and conspiracy 
theories are the most used for political purposes and campaigns (59, 61, 62, 63). Of 
course, social media platforms could not be absent from the fake news analysis, as they 
are inextricable with the creation and spread of fake news content. Nowadays, when so-
cial media platforms are so popular it has become very easy to share any type of content 
through social media to a specific audience and then due to the echo chamber effect to be 
spread among “side users”, according to their community and searches. The only issue 
for fake news creators is the fact that even social media users sometimes seem to question 
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the credibility and accuracy of social media content in comparison with traditional media 
sources. (76, 77) 
As previously mentioned, fake news is used in political campaigns, however, not neces-
sarily directly from politicians. Media outlets take on the role of the intercessor and do 
the job on behalf of the political parties, without investing in obtaining accurate infor-
mation. (53) Satirical memes, outdated content and coordinated inauthentic behavior are 
some tactics used by those media outlets in order to serve specific interests. (94, 95) 
Nevertheless, there are some plans and actions to tackle misinformation that are taken at 
governmental and EU levels.  For example, after 2016 there was a cooperation of 43 
governments in order to proceed with a plan of fake news tackling. this plan consists of 4 
pillars that include targeting social media platforms,  targeting offenders, targeting gov-
ernmental capacity, and targeting citizens, civil society and media organizations (113). 
Concerning the EU (116), a Code of Practices was created to provide a major protection 
layer to EU citizens. Under this context, the EU decided to cooperate with the 3 social 
media giants (Google, Facebook, and Twitter) and put them responsible for this serious 
issue. The main sectors of the collaboration would be to ensure scrutiny of advertisement 
placements, political adverting transparency, and integrity of services. 
A high-level experts committee on online misinformation was formulated by the Euro-
pean Commission. The objective of this committee was to create a report (115) for the 
present and future course of action. These actions were focused on 5 specific elements. 
Such elements include transparency enhancement of online news, media, and information 
literacy promotion, development of tools for users and journalistic empowerment, safe-
guard the diversity and sustainability of EU news and media ecosystem, and promote 
continued research on the disinformation impact in the EU through monitoring and re-
porting. 
One of the means to spread misinformation over social media is malicious accounts also 
called bots. A bot is a software which is programmed to perform simple and repetitive 
robotic tasks (97,98) and can be categorized as malicious (bad bots) or well-intentioned 
(good bots) (103, 104), Bots are widely used in election campaigns and are programmed 
to automatically produce content and interact with other users (83). 
Facebook and Twitter have decided to collaborate with 3rd party fact-checking organiza-
tions in order to provide an extra protection layer on online disinformation (116). These 
organizations aim to search and conclude on whether a claim is accurate or not.  
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They may choose non-partisanship media outlets that provide truthful information with-
out the intention to deceive (119, 120). To manage this context, the IFCN (International 
Fact-Checking Network) decided to create a Code of Principles and many organizations 
from 27 countries responded and became members. These organizations are obliged to 
follow the Code of Principles which mainly promotes transparency and empowers the 
extinction of partisan media. (122-124)     
 
Scope of subject research work 
The goal of this research work is to examine the concept of misinformation in relation to 
the European Elections (EU) 2019 as a case study. First, we explore the Code of Practices 
published by the European Commission to address the spread of online misinformation 
and its compliance status with online platforms, leading social networks, and the adver-
tising industry. Second, we analyze the social media profiles of main political figures in 
the elections in terms of misinformation. More specifically, we study what are the tactics 
used by the political carriers in order to attract people and get more votes in the election. 
Furthermore, we also present how social media campaigns were used by the European 
party leaders during the last EU election 2019. Finally, we investigate the previously fact-
checked articles related to EU elections 2019 by using state-of-the-art and open-source 
fact-checking tools. We employ open source free tools. We also provide some analysis of 
fact-checking tools for tackling misinformation. 
The structure of the remaining thesis is as below: 
In chapter 3, we explain our research methodology and describe how the data was col-
lected, how do we use the data sources and why 4 political leaders (Manfred Weber, 
Philippe Lamberts, Dacian Ciolos, and Iratxe Garcia Perez) were selected. It is important 
to mention that we use already existing data for our research. A case study approach was 
adopted as a research methodology to investigate misinformation in EU elections 2019 
based on social media sources. The last part of this section refers to the trustworthiness 
of the study. 
In chapter 4, We conduct an experimental analysis of the main online social media (Twit-
ter, and Facebook, etc.,) activities of EU political parties and the impact of some fact-
checking tools.  We investigate the behavioral differences among all four political leaders 
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and analyze the results. We also present analysis using open-source fact-checking tools 
that include but not limited to MisinfoMe1, NewsGuard2, etc., 
In chapter 5, we provide the conclusion of our research work.   
 
 
 
 
1 https://misinfo.me/misinfo/home 
2 https://www.newsguardtech.com/ 
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2 Literature review 
In this section, we present the results of the literature review regarding the most important 
concepts of misinformation. The main search source was Google Scholar, and then we 
were being redirected to various electronic libraries. The keywords strings which we used 
are “MISINFORMATION”, “DISINFORMATION”, “FAKE NEWS IN ELECTIONS”, 
“FAKE NEWS TYPES”, “MISINFORMATION TACKLING”, “FAKE NEWS ON SO-
CIAL MEDIA”, “MISINFORMATION/ DISINFORMATION IN ELECTIONS”. Then 
we read all relevant articles and started forming the chapters of the thesis, as per the Con-
tents structure. We selected only scientific articles and publications in the English lan-
guage without strict date restrictions, by taking into account that articles regarding defi-
nitions and general information can be taken from old publications, but case studies and 
analysis for specific situations (i.e. 2016 US election) should be taken from recent publi-
cations done in the last 2-3 years. This part of the thesis covers the RQ1 (Chapter 3.1) 
and help us define the most important concepts of misinformation. 
2.1 Misinformation and disinformation 
In this section, we present various definitions of the literature for both disinformation and 
misinformation terms. These definitions will be used as a basis and introduction for our 
analysis. To understand the meanings of misinformation and disinformation, we may first 
gain an understanding of the information as a concept. 
2.1.1 What is information 
Merriam- Webster defines information as, the solution of uncertainty and answer to the 
question “what an entity is” by defining its characteristics. It relates to both data and 
knowledge (7). The data rely on different parameters and knowledge relies on the level 
of understanding a concept.  
Dretske stated that information is an objective of two parts, which include its technical 
composition and the ordinary sense of the term information (44). Through the technical 
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composition, Dretske addressed the analysis of behavior based on specific information, 
whereas the concept of the ordinary sense is primarily utilized in areas where the news, 
the learning and the knowledge perform a critical role.  Dretske also believes information 
contains a dimension of truthfulness since it refers to incidents that have happened in the 
real world (44). In this paper, we examine the “ordinary sense” of information and its 
negative consequences, i.e. disinformation and misinformation (1,2). 
Another philosopher of information, Luciano Floridi, influenced by Dretske but not fully 
congruent supports that the term information is a composite and complex concept, so 
cannot be analyzed only by the SDI (Standard Definition of Information, which supports 
that information is meaningful and well-structured data) and needs to be revised. The SDI 
concept supports that even false information is part of the term “information”, but he 
cannot accept that as he strongly argues that the adjective “false” can define overall the 
term “information” (3,5). The information has to be a sincere concept by default  
and adds its truthfulness part, while SDI is much more generic including the “false” side  
of information (3). He claims that “false information” is not a valid term and should be 
reverted either to misinformation (when the content is false, but not on purpose) or disin-
formation (when the content is intentionally created to mislead the recipients) (6). Sim-
pler, he separates information from its false derivatives and gives a truthfulness dimen-
sion to the terminology. 
In the same direction, De George also focuses on the important asset of information, the 
concept of truth. When information contains misleading or fake parts, then we need to 
follow different approaches and definitions. De George separates data and information 
due to the fact that data do not contain any point of truth when they are raw and not 
processed or structured, while original information does (42). 
Brock and Dhillon (40) define information as a generic term like the “ether” of the middle 
ages, that can be spread around but cannot be caught, giving a more abstract approach to 
the matter. 
Ulrich (41) analyzing the concept from another aspect and connects information with data 
and supports that if data are raw incidents of the world, information is data with a specific 
meaning. This happens when data obtain a meaningful context and then can be perceived 
as information. 
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2.1.2 What is misinformation 
 
Merriam-Webster defines misinformation as false or not accurate information (13). Ac-
cording to the UK Parliament misinformation refers to the unintentional sharing of false 
information (14).   Floridi defines misinformation as a false section of semantic content, 
in which it exists as a subcategory of the term disinformation (6). While Fox believes that 
misinformation must be treated in the same way as information, the sole difference is that 
misinformation is always false while information is alethically neuter. For Fox, the alethic 
value of misinformation is standard and is always “false”, while the alethic value of in-
formation is “true” (45).  
Sille Obelitz Søe (15), quotes the definitions of Floridi & Fox as per below: 
Floridi (6) defines misinformation as the false section of semantic content, in which exists 
as subcategory the term disinformation, while Fox (45) believes that misinformation has 
to be treated with the same way as information, with the only difference that misinfor-
mation is always false while information is alethically neuter. For Fox, the alethic value 
of misinformation is standard and is always “false”, while the alethic value of information 
is “true”. Fallis defines misinformation as the different types of content that contain inac-
curate information. For Fallis, the intention characterizes whether content will be cap-
tured as misinformative or disinformative (16, 17).  Loose defined misinformation as in-
formation that is just incomplete (19) and Karlova & Lee (20) also stated that misinfor-
mation might be not accurate, uncertain, misleading (not clear) or ambiguous.  
Another approach of Libicki (2007), indicates that misinformation is accepted or more 
easily accepted by people that support or share the same ideas and vision. Thus, it is more 
likely to be misinformed (34,35). The biases and beliefs that somebody may have in terms 
of politics, religion or general issues, can be a critical factor of misinformation ac-
ceptance, comparing it with the acceptance of unbiased and impartial audiences. In fact, 
there are cases that by trying to tackle misinformation, led to opposite results and finally 
strengthen the misinformation claims (37,38). 
Biases and personal beliefs (political, religious, national, etc.) are very important parts of 
the misinformation concept and as Kumar and Geethakumari (2014) state in their analy-
sis, the most dominant source of misinformation is the media. Especially in the last years, 
when governments and politicians can be described as crucial players of the misinfor-
mation development. Of course, social media networks (platforms, blogs, etc.) have 
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played a key role, considered as the most important sources of misinformation spread, 
due to the speed of dissemination and the direct interaction with the users. Amplified by 
the social media platforms in some cases, forming of cyber- ghettos based on echo-cham-
bers and human biases, have also played a role in the diffusion of misinformation and 
finally resulted in false beliefs on serious topics (politics, religious, etc.) in parts of the 
general public (36).  
 
Picture 1 presents the seven different types of misinformation, and the scope that each 
type serves, according to Watts (2018, 73). Useful patterns can be found in the below 
matrix, while it is easier to understand the motives that lead to any different type of mis-
information. 
 
Picture 1: Misinformation matrix (73) 
2.1.3 What is disinformation 
Disinformation is false information spread intentionally to mislead the intended receivers. 
They equally considered it as a subcategory of misinformation (22, 23, 24). Bellemare 
has the same view and defines disinformation as the deliberate creation of false content 
to mislead recipients (25). Floridi defines disinformation as a subcategory of misinfor-
mation. He also focused on the intentionally given misleading part of the false semantic 
content (6).  
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Fallis has done the most extensive analysis of the term. His main definition is that disin-
formation is “information that is intentionally misleading that is likely to lead the people 
to accept false beliefs”, continuing by saying that the operation of misleading people can 
be obtained in 2 ways, either by evolution or by design, both of them intentional. In the 
case of designed disinformation, there are examples of lies and political propaganda, 
which is implemented by the source after a plan that has political or other benefits, while 
in the evolution case there are examples of conspiracy theories that are used regularly so 
as to favor only the creator. Fallis, adds also another dimension of disinformation by in-
troducing the term “semantic or representational content” and by saying that a fact is not 
necessary to happen so as to be depicted with a text or an image and there are possibilities 
that representational content can be either true or false. He has also analyzed the termi-
nology “true disinformation”, which mainly refers to the implication of trying to convince 
somebody for something false by using something literally true and as an example (26, 
Adler, J. 1997) he uses the situation where a man is asked by a criminal where is his friend 
and he answers “ around Nevada” in order to mislead the criminal with a generic, but also 
true information . This method is also called falsely implication and it is not accidental, 
but when true disinformation is being spread in the web with no intention to mislead the 
recipient might believe that the information is correct and accurate (8-12). 
He has (27) also enriched the term of disinformation by referring to its subcategories as 
per described below: 
• Disinformation on the governmental or military level: By deliberately spreading false 
news that serves the goals of specific strategies. This can be achieved even by single 
individuals with high public influence. 
• Disinformation as part of a planned fraud: Hackers have the skills to intentionally 
tamper information in the web, but there are also cases where individuals have done so, 
either in Wikipedia or a political context. 
• In-direct disinformation: There are many examples where disinformation comes in-
directly from actors that were not initially created the content and do not serve directly 
their goals. An example could be political parties interacting with biased media for spe-
cific news spreading. 
• Another type of disinformation (not written or verbal): Another type of disinformation 
which is used can be doctored images that try to present an image either in a negative or 
positive way, hiding its real state. 
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• Targeted disinformation: Specific messages that refer to a particular team or organi-
zation. 
• Machine targeted disinformation: Web crawling is an example of machine targeted 
disinformation, where a manager of a website tries to trick a search engine by referring 
to a competitor's page in order to gain sessions and views. 
 
Another approach to disinformation (18) defines it as deliberately deceptive information, 
containing unknown incentives that might be political, social, benevolent or even per-
sonal. Karlova and Fisher believe that disinformation (and misinformation) is a sub-sec-
tion of information, due to the fact that even disinformation might have truthfulness some-
times. 
2.1.4 The impact of misinformation and disinformation 
This section explains the differences between disinformation and misinformation and 
their impact on general public beliefs. For example, disinformation and misinformation 
differ in intent. It will be interesting to further explore either disinformation or misinfor-
mation have differences and commonalities. 
Information, misinformation, and disinformation are spread through people (media, pol-
iticians, public carriers, etc.) targeting the general public and its sub-categories, but some-
times it is difficult to separate and categorize content as information, misinformation or 
disinformation. 
Under this context, Karlova (20) tried to distinct them as inaccurate information (misin-
formation) and deceptive information (disinformation) and emphasized in the fact that 
people may spread any kind of news -misinformative or disinformative- even if they don’t 
support it or believe it, but just because it is related with the most recent hot topics of the 
public interests.  
 In table 1, below,  tries to summarize the features of each term (information, misinfor-
mation, disinformation), based on four attitudes: True, Complete, Current, Informative 
and Deceptive, due to the fact that sometimes is difficult to distinguish the motivation and 
incentives of any unique piece of information, that finally can be misinformation or dis-
information depending on the data of the below fields. 
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 Information Misinformation Disinformation 
True Y Y/N Y/N 
Complete  Y/N Y/N Y/N 
Current Y Y/N Y/N 
Informative Y Y Y 
Deceptive N N Y 
Y= Yes; N= No; Y/N= Could be Yes and No, depending on context and time 
Table 1: Summary of features of information, misinformation & disinformation (20) 
 
A similar view is presented by Thorson (28) who claims that both disinformation and 
misinformation are false, not accurate and misleading, but their main difference occurs 
from the intention to cheat the recipients of the content. Although there is a tendency by 
the journalism community to confuse those 2 terms and treat them as synonyms and name 
every single piece of inaccurate information as misinformation, Thorson and Wardle 
(28,29) claim that this does not represent the reality. 
When misinformation and disinformation are being handled as two identical terms, the 
sense of the intense is being lost thus there is no separation from content creators that are 
causing harm deliberately and the rest that might cause harm as well but without any 
intention and maybe due to their biases or low level of education. So, it is important to 
treat those two terms separately with their own peculiarities respectively. (3,4,9,10,11,12, 
30). Mahon (31) also agrees and endorses by referring to the importance of the above-
mentioned categorization, which finally leads to the overall distinction of lies (content 
that is wrong but believed that is accurate), misleadingness (inaccurate but based on ver-
bal & gesture complexities) and deception (successful misleading on purpose).  
Another analysis on the topic can be done if we consider the opinions of Hernon (1995) 
and Fetzer (2004), for the element of lying. When somebody disinforms somebody else, 
it means that there is the intention to lye, but this doesn’t mean that when somebody 
spreads lies has always the intention to deceive, as this person might be simply misin-
formed. (32,33) 
Stahl (39) looks into the term “semantic attack” in order to explain the differences be-
tween misinformation and disinformation. He actually believes, that it is a hard task to 
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separate and title content either as misinformation or disinformation and that there many 
cases in the web that due to semantic attacks the final information that the users receive 
is misleading. 
Fallis (8), draw our attention to the chain of communication before the false information 
reaches an audience and claims that in order to name something as disinformation it 
doesn’t need to be sent directly from the initial source. The main difference here is that 
in a chain of misinformation, there might be users that they know that this specific piece 
of information is false, but they still spread it so as to serve a goal (disinformation), while 
some other users may spread it due to the fact that they believe that this information is 
correct (misinformation). 
According to Bernd Carsten Stahl (43), the element of truth distinguishes the term infor-
mation from mis/ dis information. Information is always true while the rest are not. Then 
defines (based on the Oxford English Dictionary) that while misinformation is just 
“wrong or misleading information”, disinformation is known wrong information and 
more specifically refers to disinformation spread by governments. So, he also agrees for 
the element of “intention” in order to define and distinct both terms. 
He (Bernd Carsten Stahl, 43) enriches his claims by presenting two unique approaches to 
the differences between misinformation and disinformation from two influential philoso-
phers, Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. 
According to Habermas point of view, misinformation is not something defective, as he 
believes that is just a piece of information that is controversial and can be discussed. In 
an ideal context of communication between two parts, the first has to elaborate on the 
reasons he/ she supports that this claim is false, and the other part has to juxtapose that 
the claim is true. On the other hand, Habermas says that disinformation is problematic 
because the part that deliberately spreads it shows disregards for the recipient and thus 
the recipient is being misled. This would not be an issue if the recipient could juxtapose 
her/ his points and correct the one that spreads disinformation, but in most of the cases, 
this doesn’t happen as the recipient does not have the capabilities to do so. 
On another approach, Foucault says that the existence of difference between misinfor-
mation and disinformation is real and admits that there is a universal truth for all topics 
that are reflected by the percentage of bias, prejudice, and intention of the speaker and 
enriches by supporting that the finding of bias and intention it is not always an easy task. 
So, Foucault focuses on the discovery and why individuals are vulnerable to be deceived, 
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rather than identifying the purpose of organizations and individuals. So, his main support 
on this topic would be to offer a field of discussion and categorization on the well-inten-
tioned and the malicious organizations of the general public. 
2.2 Fake news 
In this section, we define fake news, fake news taxonomy, and actors of fake news.  We 
also explore the sources (including social media) of spreading fake news across the globe. 
Although there is not a unique and agreed definition for fake news, various writers and 
authors have tried to address this concept and by doing a Google search of the term, more 
than 1.3 billion results will be received. Thus, it is more than obvious that it is a topic/ 
term that interests a huge part of the world, either from a scientific scope or for various 
other reasons for the social life. Below we present some definitions and opinions for the 
term. 
Lilleker (48) supports that due to the plethora of definitions that exist in the literature for 
fake news, the diversity of the term might lead to being evolved as a generic term and in 
the same context Oremus (49) spars with the journalists for calling everything fake news. 
They both believe that it is a term that cannot be used in all aspects of misinformation. A 
group of authors agrees with Oremus in some of his definitions. More specifically, Plo-
thow (2017, 52) defines as fake news a story totally invented from thin air to mislead on 
purpose and this approach is also being adopted by Allcott and Gentzkow (2017, 53) who 
define fake news as stories with no real basis. Similarly, the organizers of the Fake News 
Challenge (2017, 54) determine as fake news “a totally fabricated claim with an intention 
to deceive, often for secondary gain”. 
 
As per Klein & Wueller (2017, 50), an important asset of fake news is the online medium 
that the fake story will emerge, as there are mediums that they are very favorable in cre-
ating false stories. Fake news can be defined as “the online publication of intentionally or 
knowingly false declarations of facts”. 
As mentioned by Oremus (2017, 51), even if fake news is not equal with false and inac-
curate stories, it comprises elements either “invented from thin air”, “completely fabri-
cated”, “100% false content” or “with no factual basis”. He has also revised the term 
“fake” with “false”, in order to describe more accurately what is the meaning of the term 
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and he concludes that it is “information that is designed to be tangled with real news and 
is intentionally false”. 
Dentith (2017,46) defines as fake news “the claim that a story is misleading”, while Gel-
fert (2018, 47) believes that -even if this is an interesting point of view- doesn’t structure 
things with the correct order. Gelfert claims that we should first examine the term “fake 
news” from its tactical perspective and expediency, along with its intention to deceive 
and then review -as per Dentith- the reputedly claim of the article or story based on the 
lack of some further information that when unveiled would change the status of the initial 
story. The tactical perspective is captured in the definition that Gelfert gives about fake 
news as “the deliberate presentation of (typically) false or misleading claims as news, 
where the claims are misleading by design”. More specifically he refers at the end of his 
definition the phrase “by design” which is connected with the tactical context of the cre-
ation of a fake news story. 
Bakir and McStay (2017, 55) expressed a twofold definition, as per the following: “as 
either wholly false or containing deliberately misleading elements incorporated within its 
content or context” without excluding the possibility of a fake news story that contains 
accurate parts. In similar to the above approach, Lilleker (2017, 48) has given another 
twofold approach, separating traditional news media and social media. He defined fake 
news as “the deliberate spread of misinformation either via traditional news media or 
social media”.  
Examining the issue from another aspect, Levy (2017, 56) has pointed out the role of the 
disseminators which is crucial, rather than the fake story itself. He defines fake news, the 
quotation of false stories that claim to be about the world in a context that is similar to 
credible media organizations. Thus, his main focus is the source of the content rather than 
the content itself. The above definition is akin with the opinion of Rini (2017, 57) who 
define as fake news stories that claim to be happening in the real world, mimicking the 
ways that credible media sources doing the job. Their creators know from the beginning 
that the content is false, and their main targets are the wide re-transmission of the false 
story and of deceiving at least some of the recipients. So, she also states the media sources 
with the term “mimicking”, and she enriches by adding the goals of the initial creators of 
fake news. 
Rochlin (2017, 58) focuses on another part of the term and examines the biases that people 
might have, thus it is easier to be cheated by news outlets that publish content affiliated 
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with their beliefs and similarly decline or flag as fake news whatever is against their per-
sonal convictions. While Rochlin primarily examines the term from the biases context, 
he agrees with Rini and Levy and includes in his definition the role of the media source, 
by saying that fake news can be defined as “a knowingly false headline or story written 
and published on a website that is designed to look like real news site and is spread 
through social media”. 
At this point it useful to refer that “fake news” is not a valence term. There are carriers 
that have dismissed the term and revert it with others. An example is a report by Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2018, 59) which substitutes the term “fake news” 
with the terms “misinformation” and “disinformation” and more importantly incite the 
UK government to follow the same approach. Likewise, (2018, 60) a report from Lund 
University ordered by Swedish administrative authority also modifies the term and sug-
gests using “disinformation” rather than “fake news”, in an attempt of introducing a more 
comprehensive approach. 
2.2.1 Types of fake news 
This section covers different definitions, types, sources of fake news from the literature. 
After presenting the various definitions of the literature for fake news, it would be useful 
to proceed with a categorization of the different types of fake news. 
 
According to various writers and authors (59, 61, 62, 63) an initial categorization of the 
types of fake news can be done as per below: 
• Propaganda (61,62) 
Propaganda includes the political dimension of fake news, as it is mainly created by po-
litical parties in order to serve specific political goals as part of an overall strategy. This 
is not a newly introduced concept, as it is used from World War, so as to influence the 
public opinion and alter election results.  
• News fabrication (59, 61, 62) 
News fabrication is defined as false content that has no real hypostasis and is intentionally 
created to deceive. The issue, in this case, is that this kind of content is published by 
partisan groups in websites and social media platforms, trying to mimic credible media 
sources so as to “hide” their biased identity. In fabricated news, we could also include the 
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imposter content that has similar characteristics and its validness can be searched through 
the sources and authors. 
• Satire (59, 61, 62) 
Satire is used in order to present content that is fake, under a humoristic approach. It is 
mainly created by comedians who deal with the current affairs and their actual purpose is 
not to deceive the public opinion, but to entertain it. Nonetheless, there is criticism that is 
in some instances people are misled by satire shows.  
Similar to satire, parody can be also seen as a type of fake news, which is commonly used 
by comedians in order to demean (mainly) political personalities. 
• Manipulated content (59, 61) 
Manipulated content (image, video, text) is defined as content that has been distorted for 
a purpose. There are various techniques for all kinds of distortion, but photos are the most 
easily manipulated type of content, either by adding/ deleting features or changing tech-
nical characteristics.  
• Advertising & public relations (61) 
This category refers to the advertising and public relations of specific items in an illegit-
imate way, under an original news statement for gaining profit. 
• False context of connection (59) 
False context of connection is the case where valid content is combined with false content. 
A common instance is the title of a story that does not represent the information written 
in the article.  
(65-69) In this subcategory of fake news, we can include the term “clickbait”, which is 
widely used so as to describe eye-catchy headlines that creates a “curiosity gap” for the 
readers and finally lead to the click on the link of the article. This approach would not 
have been connected with any bad definition if the eye-catchy title of the article was re-
flecting the main body text content. Instead, in clickbait cases, the title is misleading so 
as to force the user to click the article’s link and this action leads to advertising revenues 
for the creators of the article. 
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• Conspiracy theories (62) 
Conspiracy theories are defined as news stories that are presented in a way that has no 
factual proofs. They are used by various actors in order to harm politicians and cause 
outrage to the public for a person that has been victimized. (64) The most recent and well-
known conspiracy theory happened prior to the 2016 US Presidential election, called 
“Pizzagate”. That story was implicating Hillary Clinton and her campaign leader John 
Podesta in a child sex ring. This fake story proved how dangerous a conspiracy theory 
can be. A man who believed that the story entered the pizzeria and start firing with his 
rifle. Hopefully, nobody was hurt, and the man was arrested, but this situation was an 
alert to all involved that such practices can lead to destructive results. 
 
A similar categorization has been also followed by Zannettou, Sirivianos et al. (2018, 72), 
although they exclude some terms. They defined “false information” as the umbrella term, 
which consists of 3 groups. Their main group is “fake news” and they break it down as 
per below: fabrication, propaganda, imposter content and conspiracy theories. 
The above structure is useful for categorizing fake news, but below we briefly present 
some other views for the grouping of the term in order to enhance the level of the under-
standing of the term. 
Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Ling (69,70) reviewed many papers from the literature and 
finally categorized fake news in 6 types: satire, parody, fabrication, manipulation, propa-
ganda, and advertising. The common factor that these categories have, is the attempt made 
by the creators to present these types of fake news as real and finally deceive people either 
in high or low levels. In table2 we can see the level of deceiving, per sub-category. 
   Author’s immediate intention to deceive 
Level of facticity High Low 
High Native advertising 
Propaganda 
Manipulation 
News satire 
Low Fabrication News parody 
Table 2: Typology of fake news definitions (69, 70) 
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London School of Economics (71) has done a report on public policy responses on fake 
news and has separated the term as per the following classes: falsehood knowingly shared 
to undermine candidates in elections, falsehood knowingly shared for financial profit, 
parody, bad journalism/ unsupported rumors, news that is ideologically opposed and news 
that challenges orthodox authority. (Picture 2) 
 
 
Picture 2: LSE Media Policy Project - The 6 fake news types (71) 
 
 
Watts (2018, 73) also review the term fake news and its sub-classes, separating the term 
as per the following: satire or parody, misleading news, sloppy reporting, conspiracy the-
ories and intentionally deceptive news, while Claire Wardle (2017, 74) follows a different 
approach and while she believes that the term “fake news” is not helpful as it cannot 
include the complexity of the problem. For this reason, she groups “fake news” in a 
broader spectrum, under misinformation and disinformation and break it down as per be-
low from the most to least harmful (5): 
• Fabricated content 
• Manipulated content 
• Imposter content 
• False context 
• Misleading content 
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• False connection 
• Satire/ parody 
 
  
Picture 3: 7 types of mis- and disinformation (73) 
 
 
2.2.2 Fake news on social media 
This section will describe the usage and patterns of fake news on social media platforms. 
In addition to this, we will explore the main challenges and key players that primarily 
influence the global community opinion in the selection of their political leadership 
through elections. 
Over the last years, social media platforms have become the main channel of communi-
cation for many people around the world.  Some of them use social media as a news 
website, but there is a big percentage that perceives it as a centre of personal relationships. 
(76) People nowadays spend plenty of time on social media, interacting with other people 
who share the same interests and beliefs with them and also use the platforms as a way to 
share news or opinions.  
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This is one of the main reasons that misinformation is spread so fast through social media 
(77), as in some cases a simple user with no specific background or renown can reach the 
same audiences, as credible news sites.  
Furthermore, it is important to mention that over the last years there is an alteration from 
traditional media sources (newspapers, TV) to social media. One of the basic reasons for 
this revert is the financial aspect (social media are free in most cases), but additionally 
less time consuming for the users. Another important reason is the interaction context. 
Social media users can share content, comment, participate in debates, while the tradi-
tional news media sources provide a more static context with almost zero interaction. 
(81,82) 
 
In picture 4 we may have an overview of social media penetration worldwide, with more 
than 3.8 billion active users all over the world.  
 
 
Picture 4: Digital around the world in 2019, January 2019, Hootsuite & We Are Social 
(90) 
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Additionally, picture 5 presents the acceptability level of social media on US citizens, for 
the news updates of the current affairs. 
 
Picture 5: Survey conducted 12/01- 08/02/2016. “News use across social media”. Pew 
Research Center (82) 
 
On the other hand, the prosperity of social media sometimes causes serious problems, 
when the news quality and credibility is low and cannot reach the levels of traditional 
news media sources. Thus, it is much easier to diffuse fake news and reach large audi-
ences for different kinds of purposes. (81) 
This situation causes many problems, especially when fake news is connected with social 
media and use the platforms as a tool. One of the most remarkable examples of fakes 
news usage through social media is the 2016 US election, where fake news played a key 
role in the election of Donald Trump as President (53). More specifically, as per Gottfried 
& Shearer (2016, 78) 62% of the US adults are informed for the news through social 
media, (2016, 79) Facebook was the main channel of sharing fake news stories (pro-
Trump in their majority) and (2016, 80) the most worrying part is that most of them were 
being believed by the users.  In picture 6, it is clear that social media was one of the most 
important sources of election news, with percentages almost equal with websites and local 
TV (53). 
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Picture 6: Most important source of 2016 election news (53) 
 
2.2.2.1 Key characteristics of fake news on social media 
Below we present the most important features of fake news usage in social media plat-
forms. 
• Malicious accounts for propaganda  
The nature of social media has given the ability to users to create easy, quickly and low-
cost profiles that might be used for illegitimate purposes and in some cases are not human 
beings. Those accounts are called malicious and they consist of social bots, cyborg users 
and trolls (83). The common characteristic of all different kinds of malicious accounts is 
their intention to cause harm, but each of them with its own way. (81) 
• Echo chamber effect 
Social media gives to users a new way of receiving the news, contradictory to the past. 
Nowadays, news can be provided with a direct manner to users, instead of the traditional 
news where there is intermediation (2016, 84). Users are now exposed to news that is 
identical to their psychological state and beliefs, due to the fact that they have selected to 
follow specific people and pages based on them (2016, 85). Thus, social media users have 
an inclination to form groups based on their interests and opinions, creating the echo 
chamber effect. This effect enhances the procedure of fake news dissemination due to the 
following reasons (2016,86): 1) Social credibility, because people are more likely to be 
convinced for the accuracy and credibility of a story, when other people of the group 
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consider it as accurate and 2) frequency heuristic, as people are more possible to believe 
an information that they are often exposed and finally form a positive opinion for it (87, 
88). 
The result of this effect is the creation of ecosystems with limited information credibility, 
which increases polarization and misinformation spread (2016, 89). 
2.2.3 Common practices in election 
It is obvious that historically fake news is an important tool that is used for political pur-
poses, but not directly by politicians. The question that arises at this point is why an indi-
vidual or organization would start creating and sharing fake news. According to Subra-
manian (2017, 92) there are 2 reasons: 1) for financial gain through advertising, like the 
teenagers at Veles that were creating both pro-Trump & Clinton fake stories prior to the 
2016 elections in US and 2) according to Townsend (2016, 93) due to ideological identi-
fication, like the Romanian who owned the website endingthefed3, stating that he did it 
so as to help Donald Trump.  
These kinds of venues spend zero in obtaining credible information and additionally, they 
don’t care to build relationships of trust among their readers (53). 
In this section, we explain the common practices of politicians and political parties for 
spreading fake news during the election campaign. We present the concept of fake news 
and disinformation from its political aspect and more specifically what are the ways and 
tactics used by the political carriers in order to achieve their scopes. Moreover, we exam-
ine the usage of social media networks (Facebook & Twitter) during the 2019 EU election 
in some countries, based on the reach of various media outlets (professional news content, 
political news content, junk news content, etc.). 
Fake news in politics is not a new issue that has arisen, but it has been a major topic for 
discussion after the 2016 Presidential election. It is said that in the months prior to the 
2016 US election, the average American adult saw and remembered 1.14 fake news sto-
ries (53).  Picture 7 shows some of the conspiracy theories that have been used before 
2016, in order to influence the US voters. 
 
3 www.endingthefed.com  
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Picture 7: Share of Americans believing historical partisan conspiracy theories (91). 
2.2.3.1 Tactics of fake news spread for political purposes 
Below we present some of the tactics used by fake news creators in order to deceive 
readers, after studying the reports published by BBC Monitoring (94, 95): 
• Memes designed to discord 
Low-cost memes creation or distorted images that show politicians degrading poses, in 
order to politically weaken them. 
 
Picture 8: President Macron has appeared in memes containing false or distorted claims 
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Picture 9: Donald Trump distorted image   Picture 10: Bernie Sanders distortion 
 
• Coordinated inauthentic behavior 
This tactic was detected by Facebook which implicated 4 Italian groups with coordinated 
behavior. Those groups “liked” each other, had identical names and also numbers (each 
group had the same name and different number, i.e. The Great Deception 1, 2, 3, etc.) in 
case that some of them were being blocked. 
Facebook finally decided the deletion of those pages with almost 2.5 million followers 
cumulative, either due to “false or duplicated” accounts violations or “spreading incorrect 
information”. 
• Resurfacing debunked stories 
In some cases, there are some stories that presented as news of the current affair, but in 
reality, they are past stories that have been counterfeited to deceive. An example of such 
a story happened also in Italy, prior to the election, accusing the mayor Chiara Appendino 
for transforming the city of Turin into a “halal city”. This story was debunked, as the 
original article was published in 2017 and referred to a meeting with tourism carriers prior 
to a forum of Islamic Finance. 
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Picture 11: Turin’s mayor was accused of turning it into “halal city” 
• Outdated content with topical hashtags 
Another tactic for political fake news spread is the usage of very popular hashtags in 
social media platforms, so as to connect bad publicity content with politics. An example 
is the use of the hashtag #EUElections2019 in a video showing a man vandalizing a mon-
ument in Italy, supporting that he is a Muslim immigrant. The video becomes viral with 
more than 2.7 million views. After the frenzy, was proved that the original video was 
dated in 2017 in a town of Algeria and various media reported that it was fake. 
 
• Conspiracy theories 
Conspiracy theories is another tactic that is widely used in politics. More specifically, 
conspiracy theories try to implicate politicians or other people that affect the political 
scene in stories that will have negative consequences for them. An example is a 16-year-
old activist, Creta Thunberg, that was displayed in memes making an analogy of her with 
the daughter of Heinrich Himmler, known for his Nazi activity.  
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Picture 12: Climate activist Creta Thunberg has appeared in conspiratorial memes in sev-
eral languages 
 
George Soros had been also connected with her somehow by an article saying that he is 
the hidden person behind the activity of Creta Thunberg. The claim has finally debunked 
by Wired4. 
George Soros was also implicated in other conspiracy theories, like the “Master Card” 
case, where Soros was appeared –by a Slovenian website- to give two million pre-paid 
Master Cards away to migrants in November 2018. The story was also debunked by the 
fact-checking website Snopes5. 
 
 
 
2.2.3.2 How social media platforms were used for spreading fake 
news in 2019 EU election 
In this section, we present a study published by the University of Oxford (96) on how 
social media was used prior to the 2019 EU Election, in order to circumvent the result of 
the election. The platforms examined are Facebook & Twitter.  
 
4 www.wired.com 
5 www.snopes.com 
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Twitter 
As a general observation, we can say that Twitter had low percentages of fake news and 
negligible amounts of content published from Russian websites like rt.com and sput-
niknews.com. Opposite, the main sources of fake news circulated by regional or hyper-
partisan media outlets and minor proportions of them were connected with political par-
ties. 
In picture 13, we present social media data from seven countries associated with profes-
sional news outlets, professional political sources, junk news content, other political 
news/ information, and other social media types.  
At this point, it is useful to mention that Poland had the highest volumes of junk news 
circulation (21,8%), while the second-highest country was Italy with a much lower pro-
portion (8,7%). 
 
Picture 13: Types of political news and information shared over Twitter (%) between 5 
April – 20 April 2019, University of Oxford (96) 
 
 
 
Facebook 
On the other hand, Facebook has a different operation and it is a useful tool so as to 
measure the levels of influence that news articles have. In this platform and taking into 
account average stats, it seems that fake news outlets can achieve greater scores in the 
reactions buttons, compared with the credible media outlets that appear weaker in this 
part. The only countries where interactions of professional media outlets outweigh the 
fake ones are Italy and Polish. Totally opposite that the Twitter graph, where those two 
countries have the largest proportions of junk news sharing. In picture 14 we quote the 
stats. 
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Picture 14: Average Facebook interactions, per story (Shares, likes & comments) between 
5 April- 5 May 2019, University of Oxford (96) 
 
On the contrary, it is clear that credible media outlets outweigh the junk news sites on the 
overall public engagement numbers of the research. In picture 15, we can realize that even 
the most popular fake news outlets cannot reach the interaction levels of the least popular 
credible news sources. 
 
 
 
Picture 15: Total Facebook interactions, most shared junk (red)/ professional (blue) news 
sources between 5 April- 5 May 2019, University of Oxford (96) 
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2.3 Malicious accounts/ bots 
This part mainly refers to the presentation and analysis of the automated accounts, called 
bots, which are used to propagate misinformation. We briefly refer to malicious accounts 
in a previous chapter, but in this one, we provide further analysis of the role of those 
accounts in elections. 
The concept of bots is not new, as the first IRC (Internet Relay Chat) bot was created 
back in 1989 (102). The main idea before IRC bots creation was completing tasks for a 
person, while he was doing something else. After some years bots became popular and 
the first botnets were created, which were anything else than groups of bots communi-
cating with each or with a single botmaster. (105, 106) The word botnet comes from the 
words “robot” and “network” and describes how a group of programs can cooperate in 
order to perform malicious tasks. 
 
Bots are software, which is created to perform simple, repetitional, robotic tasks and they 
have the ability to quickly reproduce messages, mimic themselves and mislead users that 
those messages come from real human accounts. When they are used to complete licit 
tasks, they provide credible information, but when they are used in order to deceive, they 
become malicious by sharing different kinds of fake news. (97,98) 
(99) Social media is the main channel of operation for malicious accounts/ bots either 
through propagation algorithms or programmed accounts that are used for political pur-
poses (political bots). (100) As part of political propaganda, those accounts tend to target 
users in order to influence conversations and form false beliefs based on fake news. (101) 
Political bots are globally used by politicians with different kinds of patterns. In 2014, 
prior to the Indian election, Narendra Modi seems that was using a pattern, as many of 
their 4 million Twitter followers were twitting the same message 24 hours per day: “I 
think Nerendra Modi should be #TIMEPOY”, so as to help her win the Time Person of 
The Year award. 
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2.3.1 Types of bots 
As per botnerds 6(103, 104), we can have a basic categorization of bots, based on their 
intention.  
Good bots: Chatbots, crawlers, transactional bots, informational bots, and entertainment 
bots.  
• Chatbots: Chatbots are agents that communicate with humans, through text messag-
ing. They are programmed to respond like humans and normally are used for technology 
testing purposes. 
• Crawlers: This type of bot is used to retrieve data from APIs or websites and interact 
based on the directions that its master has given. For instance, somebody can “hide” a 
website from specific search engines, by blocking their search engine spiders. 
• Transactional bots: Those bots can be programmed in order to interact with systems 
on behalf of humans, by completing transactions. 
• Informational bots: Bots of this category feature different kinds of information like 
breaking news or push notifications.   
• Entertainment bots: In this category, we mainly feature game bots, like the bots in 
shooter games so as the user can practice and improve her/ his game or video game bots 
that you normally play against.  
Bad bots: Hackers, spammers, scrapers, impersonators. 
• Hackers: Hackers are initially designed to deceive people, spread malware and hack 
networks. They try to take advantage of weak security systems and inject malicious code 
into websites. 
• Spammers: Spambots are designed to disseminate false content on the web and finally 
lead people to specific websites in order to gain traffic. Also, they have activity in blog 
posts and social media, by adding comments with links to spam sites.  
• Scrappers: Scrappers are designed to steal data from websites. Then the scraped con-
tent is published for advertising reasons, i.e. to “catch” users searching for specific key-
words. 
 
6 www.botnerds.com  
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• Impersonators: Those bots are used mainly for political purposes and propaganda 
dissemination, by creating social media profiles that seem to be real, but they are fake. 
2.3.2 Social bots in election 
After the analysis of the general types of bots, below we present another sub-section of 
malicious account/ bots (if the bot intends to cause harm), the social bots.  
A malicious social bot is a social media account that is manipulated by an algorithm, 
automatically produces content and interacts with other social media users with the inten-
tion to deceive (83). A week before the 2016 US election, researches show, that about 19 
million bot accounts were posting either pro-Trump or Clinton tweets, a serious indication 
for the volume of automated activity and possible corruption of the result (107). Such 
campaigns are sometimes called “Twitter bombs” (110). 
A strong indication that an account might be a social bot is the re-posting activity just a 
few seconds that the original post was published. Another sign is when a famous and 
influential person is mentioned (i.e. @realDonaldTrump) in debunked claims. 
Research shows that malicious social bots tend to target users with many followers, in 
order to increase the chances that the content will reach large audiences, but surprisingly 
it is proven that humans do most of the fake news retweeting (deceived by bots), almost 
equal with their retweeting activity from human users. The previous claims are signs that 
human users can be deceived by malicious social bots. (108) 
Social bots have been used for political aims, to manipulate the stock market, scrape per-
sonal data and diffuse misinformation. (109) 
 
2.3.2.1 Detection of social bots 
(109) In this section a social media bots taxonomy is provided, separated into 3 sections, 
although in some cases it is not easy to clearly divide them as some of their features are 
mixed: 
• Detection based on social media data (graph-based detection), where detection strat-
egies are done based on social graphs that can reveal the connections between social bots 
(sometimes called sybils). (111) 
• Crowdsourcing social bot detection: (112) Wang et. Al introduced the crowdsourcing 
detection method, by using data from Facebook and Renren (a Chinese social media 
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network) and assigning the work of detection to humans rather than the machines, from 
simple information of their profiles.   
• Feature-based social bot detection: This method works by using machine learning 
techniques, based on the behavioral patterns of the social bots. Various classes are auto-
matically created depending on the activity of the bot. 
2.4 How to tackle fake news 
In this section, we will describe key approaches to tackle the disinformation including 
fake news in elections. We have included 3 axes/ subchapters for the tackling of this 
phenomenon.  
The first refers to the measurements taken by governments, the second to the EU code of 
practice that contains the specific actions that EU has done and is currently doing and the 
last to the fact-checking tools that are widely used by various organizations in order to 
assess the validity of information shared through the web.  
Under this context, different stakeholders have taken action for this important issue, either 
co-operating - in some cases- for the commonweal or by nonrecurring actions. In picture 
16 we present some of them which are further analyzed in the below sections. 
 
Picture 16: Disinformation initiatives timeline (69) 
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2.4.1 Governmental measurements  
This subchapter mainly refers to the measures that have been taken at the governmental 
level for misinformation tackling in social media.  
After 2016, about 43 governments have either suggested or executed various measure-
ments in order to provide solutions for the huge problem of disinformation. We can do a 
basic categorization of the measurements, as per the following categories (113):  
• Measures targeting social media platforms 
• Measures targeting offenders  
• Measures targeting government capacity 
• Measures targeting citizens, civil society and media organizations 
 
Measures targeting social media platforms 
We break this category down into 3 sub-categories, as per below: 
• Content takedowns by social media platforms 
As social media has become the main platform for political information, governments can 
nowadays remove (after communicating with social media companies), block and filter 
content that has been considered malefic, either in democratic or authoritarian regimes. 
Many countries work in this direction and try to create the legislative framework in order 
to become feasible for social media companies to track and remove harmful content. The 
process is executed under the supervision of each government. 
• Advertising transparency  
Despite the fact that in most countries there are clear regulations for print advertising in 
politics, the online part of political advertisements has still progress to be made. Trans-
parency improvement remains a major issue for online political advertising and some 
countries demand from the social media platforms providers to reveal to users which po-
litical parties or politicians have paid to be advertised. Also, social media companies try 
to block exterior funding for indigenous campaigns. 
• Data protection 
Data is an important asset for political campaigns through social media, including mean-
spirited campaigns, and are used for targeting purposes. Millions of social media users 
have been exposed to manipulative content over the last years, so even the companies are 
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now able to understand it and treat it as a major problem. Although it has been accepted 
that this issue has to be tackled, there are still countries that have not taken any measures 
yet, but there have been also positive steps in this direction. The new General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) which is valid in Europe from May 2018 is a sign of improve-
ment, but still, many more actions have to follow at a global level. 
 
 
Measures targeting offenders 
We break this category down into 2 sub-categories, as per below: 
• Criminalization of disinformation and automation 
Criminalization of misinformation diffusion is used by some countries as an extra meas-
ure of protection. Financial fines are imposed on violators, but also imprisonment in some 
cases. Additionally, there are countries that try to solve the problem of automation (bots 
campaigns), by penalizing the automated activity of political parties or individual politi-
cians.  
• Expanding the definition of illegal content 
As already described, the current legislation has some gaps regarding the comprehensive 
tackling of online disinformation. Under this context, the action is planned for reconsid-
eration of the existing legislature, devoted implementation and innovative definitions of 
illegal online content. For instance, Australia has created a strict framework of punish-
ments for non-complaint users. 
 
Measures targeting government capacity 
• Parliamentary inquiries and Congressional hearings  
Parliamentary inquiries are the governmental tool for situations that the existing legisla-
tion has become inadequate. They are used in order to initiate the procedures of changing 
or correcting any defective part of the regulation in use and many countries have followed 
this approach so as to comprehend the social media effect in democracy. Furthermore, 
the US has applied Congressional hearings in order to look into the Russian implication 
in the 2016 Presidential election. 
• Security and defense 
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The foreign involvement in the domestic election has raised also cybersecurity and de-
fense issues which are handled by the appropriate governmental authorities so as to max-
imize the security levels. Measurements such as systematic observation of the web, of-
fenses identification, strategic analysis of the offenses, reporting, and debunking are al-
ready taken by some countries.  
• Monitoring and reporting 
Some countries work on different dimensions by creating portals that users can point out 
and report pieces of misinformation. The G7 countries have initiated the establishment of 
a Rapid Response Mechanism for disinformation reporting, especially for the election. 
Also, Italy has made a portal to monitor misinformation dissemination where citizens can 
report any piece of information that they consider as fake, in order to be assessed by the 
appropriate authorities. 
 
Measures targeting citizens, civil society and media organizations 
• Media literacy and watchdogs   
The part of media literacy and watchdogs refer to the long term strategy that should be 
followed by governments in the next decades. In this context, the harmful usage of social 
media can be tackled by enhancement of digital public literacy, skills in browsing on the 
web and quality assessment of the available online content. Many countries have started 
working on this direction by funding long-term strategic programs against misinfor-
mation. 
• Media accreditation and journalistic control   
This section has a bipolar meaning. When governments control media, various negative 
consequences may arise, as guided journalism that serves specific goods of the govern-
ment without being impartial. On the other hand, setting up rules and validating the media 
quality in a transparent context can increase the credibility of information and the citizens' 
sense of safety on the web.  
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2.4.2 EU measurements 
In this section, we explore the EU practices against misinformation and its compliance 
status.  It is pertinent to mention that these codes of practices were devised in a collabo-
ration with social media platforms which include Google, Facebook, and Twitter, etc. 
 
EU Code of Practices on disinformation in cooperation with Google, Facebook and 
Twitter (116) 
One of the major actions that the EU has taken to counter disinformation, was to cooperate 
with the social media giants (Google, Facebook & Twitter) and take decisions regarding 
the problem. To this end, these social media platforms are committed to publishing 
monthly reports on the actions taken and the progress that they have done on disinfor-
mation tackling. Those actions have to be fully compliant with the EU Code of Practice 
against disinformation and they mainly (not exclusively) concern political disinformation 
on election regarding scrutiny of ad placements, political ads transparency and integrity 
of services. Below we briefly present the results of those measurements during May. 
 
 
 
 
Google 
Google reported (116) that has taken 16.960 actions on EU Google ads accounts regarding 
scrutiny of ad placements, for infringing the company’s policies on misrepresentation and 
another 5.465 actions for violations of inadequate content.  
As regards political ads transparency, Google approved for launching 174 out of 676 po-
litical campaign applications. Most of the applications failed due to the fact that were not 
compliant with the required documents needed. More than 50.000 ads were blocked to be 
displayed because they fail to meet the verification specifications. 
Concerning the integrity of services, YouTube removed over 860.000 channels for spam, 
deceptive practices, and scams policy infractions. Also, another 60 channels were re-
moved for policy on impersonation violations. 
Facebook 
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As regards the scrutiny of ad placements, Facebook (116) didn’t publish any data on low-
quality ads removal and took back its intention to delete deceptive, misleading and false 
content. For this reason, the EU Commission incited Facebook to provide the data on a 
regular basis, in order to become feasible to constantly monitor and act when necessary. 
Regarding political ads transparency, Facebook published an Ads Library report which 
gives information on political ads spending and issue-based ads in the EU, including in-
formation for each advertiser, the “paid for by” disclaimer, the total amount and a link to 
the original advertisement. From the end of March until the end of May almost 20 million 
political ads were spent across the Member States. 
Concerning the integrity of services, Facebook removed some pages, accounts, groups 
and also confine users who have violated Facebook live.  
 
Twitter 
As far as the scrutiny of ad placements is concerned during May, Twitter (116) denied 
1.428 ads for violating with its Unacceptable Businesses Practices. Additionally, it did 
not allow 1.975 ads to be displayed across the EU for not complying with its Quality Ads 
policy, which should include user bio, destination URL, content (image, video, text) and 
lucidity. As regards the political ads transparency, Twitter dismissed 503 political ads due 
to the fact that it did not meet the certification process. Moreover, Twitter provided a 
report with the countries which run political campaigns and a breakdown per Member 
State. Although they recalled that the operation of the ATC (Ads Transparency Centre) 
will continue, the EU Commission called them to create an issue-based policy for trans-
parency improvement.  
Concerning the integrity of services, pre-challenged 9.775.179 accounts that might be 
fake or spammy and received 344.987 reports by users about spammy accounts. Also, 
they revised their election integrity policy by forbidding 3 categories of content. 1) Mis-
leading information on how to participate in the election, 2) voter intimidation and 3) 
false or misleading affiliation. 
 
The “HLEG” report on online disinformation 
Tackling the dissemination of misinformation is one of the most important projects for 
the European Union, in order to defend the democratic values that have introduced and 
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represents. Thus, the EU is obliged to do its very best so as to tackle the dissemination of 
misinformation and protect its citizens from being exposed to harmful content (114). In 
order to achieve the above, EU formed a high-level group of experts (“the HLEG”) for 
the creation of a report (115) that includes the main pillars against misinformation as per 
below: 
• Transparency enhancement of online news 
Transparency is a major issue for improvement in the digital world of information. By 
increasing transparency, we empower the media literacy on both citizens and journalists 
sides, thus all concerned parts will be able to evaluate news quality and the whole process 
of news production, in a wider spectrum. For those reasons the European Commission 
works in cooperation with the Member States in the below axes, in order to upgrade trans-
parency levels of online news: 
i. Increase transparency of funding sources 
All online pieces of information have to clearly mention its creator, in order to be feasible 
for the readers to identify the person who is behind each news article. Also sponsored 
content has to totally identifiable, especially in terms of political advertising. 
ii. Increase transparency of online news sources and journalistic processes 
Online transparency indicators have to be created, so as to ensure users that the content 
is accurate, credible and qualitative. Investments in fact-checking and journalistic training 
are some of the fields that need improvement to achieve the target. Additionally, the vis-
ibility of accurate content has to be enhanced, in order to weaken the disinformation 
sources. In this direction, news websites may reveal the way that their algorithms are 
developed without biased motivations. 
iii. Increase transparency and efficiency of fact-checking practices 
Fact-checking practices are another major axe to be improved by the collaboration of fact-
checking organizations, verification organizations, and newsrooms, all of them, under the 
EU guidance. The outcome of this effort should be an “open” fact-checking market, to-
tally excluding monopoly practices. In this direction, independent European Centres 
could support this attempt and ensure the interdisciplinary and fact-checked based re-
search, while online platforms must be able to provide privacy-compliant access to data 
for the recognition of disinformation creators and evaluation of fact-checking practices. 
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• Media and information literacy promotion 
Media and information literacy have become, nowadays, the starting point for critical 
thinking progress concerning all kinds of information. Thus, the main objective of this 
pillar is the life-long education starting from young kids to older people. To this end, the 
HLEG suggests the below for the improvement of media and information literacy: 
i. Promoting a reassessment and adjustment of educational policies 
Media and information literacy are key objectives for tackling disinformation and this 
point of view has to be adopted at a national level, in order to start being part of the 
schools' curriculums. Under this context the teachers should obtain the educational back-
ground to impart the knowledge, thus governments have to provide their assistance by 
mandating teacher training colleges. 
ii. Support for information and literacy programs for citizens of all ages 
Support of information and literacy programs should be encouraged for all ages and de-
mographics groups, instead of being only a privilege of the younger ages. All relevant 
parts should work and collaborate to dismiss silos and maximize efficiency and more 
specifically the European Commission may support attempts in this direction. 
 
 
• Tools development for users and journalists empowerment 
Users' and journalists' empowerment is another key component to counter disinformation. 
The accomplishment of this target can be achieved with the deployment of tools that pro-
vide quality signals identification. Below we quote the main fields of action: 
i. Users (citizens) empowerment  
Different kinds of applications should be developed to strengthen users and provide them 
the ability to better check the online content that they are being exposed to. At this end, 
client-based interfaces may be created and allow users to access content according to the 
quality signals. This would be the initial step for the basic control of information that 
users are exposed to. 
ii. Journalists empowerment  
Nevertheless, efforts for journalism empowerment should not hesitate. By strengthening, 
credible media representatives citizens level of trust increases, thus accurate media outlets 
are rewarded and supported to keep up the good work. Professional automatic content 
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verification tools for audio-visual and text-based reports published online are required to 
empower media outlets' reputation. Furthermore, training and media innovation may have 
a significant impact on the success of the project and should be treated with increased 
attention. 
 
• Safeguard the diversity and sustainability of the European news media ecosystem 
Taking for granted that producing disinformation is easier and cheaper than accurate 
news, it is crucial to create an information framework where any form of censorship will 
be dismissed. In order to achieve this target, all relevant actors should work with a long-
term vision and protect the financial sustainability of the news media ecosystem. Below 
we present the axes of improvement: 
i. Actions at European level 
Taking as landmark the US funding strategy (120 million USD) for the protection of the 
election prestige from foreign interference, the HLEG expects equal level funding, 
through Horizon 2020, to be used mostly in empowering qualitative news media, fact-
checking organizations, training journalists, sources verification, disinformation tracking, 
investing in media literacy and research programmes.  
ii. Actions at the national level 
HLEG fully supports news media independence and does not think that governmental 
control will have a positive impact to counter disinformation, thus no interference by 
public authorities is encouraged. Also, any available public funding approved by the State 
Aid had to be used carefully and under the EU Member States protocols. 
 
• Promote continued research on the disinformation impact in EU through monitoring 
and reporting 
The above-mentioned pillars have to be set under a centralized context so as to maximize 
the results and apply the strategy against disinformation in an effective manner. Below 
we present the main axes: 
i. A structured implementation framework 
The HLEG suggests that a structured plan, specific timeframes for evaluation, collabo-
rating of all relevant stakeholders and continuous evaluation are the very basic steps that 
need to be implemented to set the working framework. 
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ii. Scope of a general European Code of Practices to counter disinformation 
In order to create a European Code of Practices for tackling disinformation, it is essential 
to adopt a multi-dimensional approach by: 
1) Clearly identifying the relevant stakeholders 
2) Set up rules for each group of stakeholders based on the HLEG agreed framework 
3) An evaluation mechanism development for the processed measurements 
4) Safeguarding coordination among the EU centres  
5) Identification and filling of the existing gaps 
6) Avoiding the substitution of self-regulatory systems  
7) Synchronization of mechanisms already in use 
 
iii. A multi-stakeholder engagement process 
A group of all relevant stakeholders should be formed including online media, news me-
dia outlets, journalists, content creators, advertisers, and fact-checkers, in order to be fea-
sible for each of them to contribute to disinformation tackling. 
 
iv. Key principles and roadmap to guide the Code of Practices 
The key principles below, have been approved and agreed between the HLEG committee. 
1) Platforms should apply the follow-the-money principle and discourage any moti-
vation of disinformation diffusion for profit 
2) Platforms have to guarantee transparency and public accountability, taking into 
account human privacy, freedom and media multidimensionality  
3) Sponsored content has to be clearly identified 
4) Platforms should give access (GDPR compliant) to data to fact-checking organi-
zations 
5) Platforms should collaborate with public and private news outlets and provide 
accurate and credible news to users 
6) When feasible, platforms should combine news with related news recommenda-
tions 
7) Platforms should be easy-to-use and easily connected with fact-checking websites 
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8) Platforms that are created based on users interactions should be protected by sys-
tems so as to avoid being abused 
9) Platforms should give access to their functioning and algorithmic data to academic 
researchers, so as to help them discover a common approach to tackle the diffusion 
of disinformation  
 
v. Independent and permanent evaluation 
A permanent review mechanism should be developed so as to constantly monitor the pro-
gress of the Code of Practice 
vi. Coordination with the European centres for research on disinformation  
The HLEG believes that the achievement of the suggested measurements is totally con-
nected with the establishment of the European centres, which are going to be leaders of 
interdisciplinary projects against disinformation 
2.4.3 Fact-checking 
In this section, we will study the role of fact-checking tools in disinformation. This work 
will help us to determine the role of social media through the use of fact-checking tools, 
and how they contribute overall to disinformation tackling.  
The term “fact-checking” refers to the process of converting an incomprehensible fact to 
something understandable (117). Taking this claim as a basis a contemporary model has 
been created, for the fact-checking term, -mainly- regarding the credibility of political 
claims and statements (118). Thus, the main objective of fact-checking organizations 
nowadays is to conclude whether a claim is accurate or not and then inform the public, 
improve political speech and motivate other journalists (119, 120). In order to succeed on 
this, fact-checkers are highly dependent on other media outlets that might spread their 
analysis through the media ecosystem (118,119) and through this wider media framework 
fact-checkers have to be very careful on the media that will choose to interact in order to 
avoid implications with partisan media outlets (119, 120).  
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Code of Principles 
The International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) has created a Code of Principles which 
consists of 35 organizations from 27 countries, as signatories. This code is mandatory to 
be followed by all signatories to avoid partisanship and promote fairness and transparency 
(123, 124). The Code comprises some commitments as per below, for all signatories 
(122): 
• Non-partisanship and fairness 
• Transparency of sources 
• Transparency of funding and organization 
• Transparency of methodology 
• Open and honest correction policy 
Those principles have to be followed by all organizations publishing credible and non-
partisan reports on the accuracy of various claims in regard to societal issues. (125) The 
importance of the Code has been also mentioned by Facebook and Google. Facebook 
obligates -as a minimum requirement- its fact-checkers to become signatories of the Code 
and Google marked fact-checked claims produced by signatories in its search engine re-
sults. (126) Due to the acceptance of the Code, the IFCN decided to develop a verification 
process, in order to assure that the minimum standards will be kept. When a signatory 
accomplishes the verification process, it has the privilege to be considered part of the 
IFCN including the positive impact for its reputation. In picture 15 the verification pro-
cess is visualized. 
 
Picture 17: IFCN Code of Principles verification process (126) 
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Facebook and Twitter 
Both platforms have attempted to use fact-checking tools in order to provide solutions for 
disinformation. Below we may see what has been done by each of them and what are the 
plans and the challenges for the future. 
Facebook (127) 
Facebook has started cooperation with 3rd party fact-checking organizations, in order to 
be feasible for the company to find misleading content and immediately remove it i.e. 
natural disasters images shown as a present-day event (129) and at this end they intro-
duced a fact-checking program in Karnataka -a small Indian state- to the first test in and 
then scale it up for other countries. (130) 
 
Picture 18: Facebook warnings to fake news (128) 
 
Also, the fact-checking website boom7 checks posts with controversial content and a ma-
chine learning algorithm have been created for the revelation of false content based on 
users' feedback. Then fact-checkers have to check the content and advice for the mislead-
ingness of it. (130) 
 
 
 
 
 
7 www.boomlive.in 
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Twitter (127) 
Twitter has also done partnerships with fact-checking organizations like Fact Popup and 
Hoax but still tries to understand how fake news can be easily spread to huge audiences 
and where are the original sources exist. (131) 
As regards to fact-checking solutions of the problem they have thought to develop AI 
mechanism and also is being discussed to introduce the edit option, although this solution 
can have negative consequences because an original tweet that has been retweeted in its 
original state, is edited, then retweeted and finally the same tweet is shared 2 times with 
different content. (132) 
Summary matrix of fake news tackling 
In table 3, there is a summary of the 3 main pillars of fake news tackling and their sub-
categories. All of them contribute separately in the attempt of fake news tackling and can 
be characterized as prerequisites for confronting the problem in a comprehensive manner. 
Fake news tackling measurements  
 Social 
media 
Offenders 
measures 
Government 
capacity 
Media/ 
citizens 
EU 
CoP8 
HLEG 
report 
CoP9 Facebook 
& Twitter 
Government ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔     
EU     ✔ ✔   
Fact-checking       ✔ ✔ 
Table 3: Summary matrix of fake news tackling (113, 116, 122, 127, 129, 130-132) 
 
 
8 Code of Practices 
9 Code of Principles 
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3 Data and methods 
3.1 Research questions 
In the research methodology section, we will define the research problem, goals research 
questions and selected research approach.  This section will also cover our search process 
which we will opt to find relevant research publications from the well-known electronic 
libraries and other sources.   
 
1) RQ1: How does the literature review help us to define and further understand some 
of the most important concepts of misinformation?  
2) RQ2: How do social media data extraction tools and sentiment analysis help us to 
determine the politicians' attributes in terms of negative-hate speech, neutral or positive? 
3) RQ3: How do we perform validity and accuracy checks on web articles, by using fact-
checking websites? 
3.2 Data 
The first part of the analysis is related to social media platforms. These platforms play an 
important role in the election as part of the political parties' strategy, thus that was the 
main reason for this kind of analysis choice. On the other hand, the 2nd part of the analysis 
refers to the fact-checking tools and platforms which is indissolubly connected with the 
disinformation tackling.  
The analysis/ findings part of this thesis is done by collecting secondary data (already 
existing data and not questionnaires, surveys or interviews) from various sources. Our 
main data sources were the social media accounts (Facebook and Twitter) owned by the 
four leaders of the EU political parties that dominate in the election, on May 26. Further 
to the social media part data collection, and analysis for the fact-checking tools is pre-
sented. We try to quote how the fact-checking tools can facilitate the process of misinfor-
mation tackling, by providing an introduction of some tools that either fact-check -
mainly- fake articles from non-credible sources regarding the election or assessing the 
validity and credibility of the websites that spread the news.  
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Total tweets and Facebook posts 
In figure 1 we present the following two (02) graphs regarding the total tweets and 
Facebook posts for all leaders, before the extensive analysis of the social media graphs. 
Iratxe Garcia Perez is the leader who dominates on Twitter with more than 900 tweets, 
while Manfred Weber has posted more times than any other leader on Facebook. 
 
Figure 1: a) Total number of tweets and b) total Facebook posts per leader 
 
3.3 Methods 
The research methodology of this thesis can be called “case study”. A case study is a 
research methodology that presents the results of an analysis of various behaviors of per-
sons or groups10.  In this thesis, we selected 4 political leaders in order to complete a -
post-analysis of the 2019 EU election, related to misinformation. We selected those 4 
leaders as they represent the leading parties of the European parliament, as per the 26th 
of May results. Additionally, those parties represent almost all political beliefs sides and 
this also a factor that leads to select those parties and leaders. 
 
Fact-checking - text analysis 
The tool textalyser11 can be used by either uploading a file for analysis or pasting the text. 
The tool analyses each word of the requested text and provides the ranking of the 
 
10 https://www.pressacademia.org/definition-of-case-study/ 
11 www.textalyser.net 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Ciolos Weber Perez Lamberts
LEADERS TOTALS
b
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Ciolos Weber Perez Lamberts
LEADERS TOTALS
a
49 
 
frequency of each word. The 1st column (Word) refers to the specific word found into the 
text, the 2nd column (Occurrences) refers to the exact number of words found into the 
text, the 3rd column (Frequency) refers to the frequency percentage of each word in the 
text and the last column (Rank) shows. 
 
Picture 19: Example of a text analyzer tool with all above-referred columns 
 
 
Twitter credibility 
MisinfoMe12 is a tool that checks and assesses the credibility of Twitter profiles, based 
on some specific elements. The tool has been developed as part of the Co-Inform EU 
project and its main target is to measure the impact of misinformation in social life. The 
application executes some steps in order to deliver the results. Below the steps: 
• Retrieval of the tweets, based on the search term 
• Extraction of the related URLs 
• Score provision to the account, based on the assessment of the URLs against the 
credibility model. More specifically, the URLs are cross-checked with fact-check-
ers results and based on their (fact-checkers) evaluation, the final score is assigned 
In this thesis, we present the analysis of the 4 leaders' Twitter profiles, using misinfo.me. 
The tool analyzes a number of tweets from any Twitter user (4 leaders in our case) and 
 
12 www.misinfo.me 
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finds the number of web links found in the tweets. Then evaluates the quality of the links, 
based on their website origin and provides a ranking of the profile credibility. Each web-
site's credibility is assessed by fact-checkers and external partners.13 
 
Foller.me is a tool that receives requests for Twitter profiles analysis, by checking tweets 
content and basic statistics. The below metrics are used by the tool in order to provide the 
results: 
• Basic information on Twitter profiles  
• Statistics 
• Topics, hashtags, and mentions metrics 
• Insights (tweets, retweets, tags, replies, mentions, links and media)14 
3.4 The trustworthiness of the study 
In order to complete this thesis, we use the following scientific sources and journals to 
obtain literature, and insights regarding the subject matter, and its associated areas: 
• The Philosophy of Information Quality 
• Journal of the American Society for Information Science 
• Journal of Philosophy 
• Journal of International Information Management 
• Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application 
• Journal of Internet Law 
• Journal of Economic Perspectives 
• Journal of Pragmatics 
• Journal of personality and social psychology 
• International Journal of Communication 
 
 
 
13 https://misinfo.me/misinfo/about 
14 www.foller.me 
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In this section, we conduct an experimental analysis of the main social media activities 
of EU political parties and the impact of some fact-checking tools that we discover. The 
analysis timeline refers to activities during the pre-election period (January- May 2019).  
Our approach will be based on the following steps: 
i. Collect social media data (posts, tweets) from all leaders by using data scraping tools 
ii. Conduct sentiment analysis to both Facebook posts and tweets in order to find differ-
ent patterns and behaviors regarding the social media strategy of each leader 
iii. Explore various fact-checking tools trying to discover ways to tackle misinformation 
3.5 Social media data analysis 
In this section, we conduct an analysis by collecting and analyzing social media data from 
Facebook and Twitter, from the accounts of all leaders. In this way we try to quote and 
explain the behavioral differences among all leaders, then analyze the results and extract 
conclusions. 
Facebook data have been collected from 1/1/2019 until 25/05/2019, one day prior to the 
election. We retrieved Facebook data by using the data-miner15 tool and scraping text, 
links, images, and reactions. The reactions (likes, love, etc.) have been collected manually 
as the tool could not extract the separate reactions by itself. 
Regarding Twitter data prior to the election on May 26 (also from 1/1/2019 until 
25/05/2019) we collected all four leaders tweets and reactions and furthermore 1k tweets 
with the hashtag #EUelection. We have chosen this hashtag in order to find the most 
relevant tweets, regarding the 2019 EU election, during the most intensive pre-election 
period. Also, we collected data with tweets mentioning each of the leaders (i.e. 
@ManfredWeber, @CiolosDacian, @ph_lamberts, @IratxeGarper), so as to comprehend 
the opinion and the general view of Twitter users for the leaders. Below we present the 
graphs and the conclusions of the analysis. 
 
We have conducted sentiment analysis in order to categorize positive, negative and neu-
tral tweets and also the compound score. The positive, negative and neutral scores are 
ratios for proportions of text that fall in each category and are very useful metrics for 
 
15 www.data-miner.io 
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multidimensional analysis of a text. All these 3 metrics add up to 1. The compound is 
computed by adding the score of the meaning of each word, with a range from -1 (the 
most negative) until 1 (the most positive). This metric can be used for the composite 
analysis of tweets or Facebook posts that contain various lexicon content.16 
This part of the thesis covers the RQ2 “Research Question 2” (Chapter 3.1) and provides 
some results on how social media platforms can assist us in politicians' behavior analysis, 
by using sentiment analysis. 
3.5.1 Twitter 
Dacian Ciolos 
Figure 2: a) Twitter sentiment scores and b) reactions over time by Vader tool 
In figure 2a we may see that Dacian Ciolos do not use his Twitter account so much and 
this might be due to the fact that his main social media communication channel is Face-
book, where he owns an account of more than 400k followers. The same situation is valid 
for figure 2b, where Dacian Ciolos fluctuates at a low level. 
 Likes Re-tweets 
Total 3.882 521 
Average per tweet 194,10 26,05 
Table 4: Dacian Ciolos Twitter totals 
 
 
 
 
16 https://github.com/cjhutto/vaderSentiment#about-the-scoring 
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
a)
pos neg neu compound
0
100
200
300
400
b
likes re-tweets
53 
 
Iratxe Garcia Perez 
 
Figure 3: a) Twitter sentiment scores and b) reactions over time by Vader tool 
In 3a we may see that there is not any unusual behavior that could be related with the 
election date and we can observe that all curves follow a random direction, which is quite 
logical by taking into account that Iraxte Garcia Perez most probably didn’t follow any 
social media plan and was normally tweeting for the current affairs. 
In 3b we may understand that Iratxe Garcia Perez tweets have a specific range during the 
pre-election time, with some outbreaks, but outside of a planned context. This means that 
there was not any action plan that changed her way of tweeting when the election date 
was approaching. 
 Likes Re-tweets 
Total 33.155 19.840 
Average per tweet 137,57 82,32 
Table 5: Iratxe Garcia Perez Twitter totals 
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Philippe Lamberts 
 
Figure 4: a) Twitter sentiment scores and b) reactions over time by Vader tool 
Regarding the sentiment analysis of Philippe Lamberts (4a), we see that the compound is 
balanced and that means that his content mainly approaches neutrality. Also, neutrality 
levels are pretty high, and we cannot find any specific pattern on the sentiment analysis. 
Inversely with Iratxe Garcia Perez, in 4b we can see that the graph of the reaction of 
Philippe Lamberts displays some peak periods and some low periods. This might be the 
result of a planned strategy that produces content which is targeted to reach specific au-
diences and then lead to reactions. 
 
 Likes Re-tweets 
Total 3.801 1.739 
Average per tweet 13,58 6,21 
Table 6: Philippe Lamberts Twitter totals 
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Manfred Weber 
 
Figure 5: a) Twitter sentiment scores and b) reactions over time by Vader tool 
Manfred Weber seems to have a positive impact on his followers (5a), as during all the 
pre-election periods the positive sentiment overcomes the sentiment and the same hap-
pens with the compound which is mainly over the 0 levels and only in few cases below. 
Concerning the reactions part (5b), we can see that there is not only one peak period and 
that when the election was approaching there was a reduction. This might be part of a 
strategy or paid activations, but we should also consider that maybe the current affairs 
developments led to those results. 
 
 Likes Re-tweets 
Total 48.501 14.696 
Average per tweet 91,68 27,78 
Table 7: Manfred Weber Twitter totals 
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4.1.1.2 1K tweets with hashtag #EUelection (pre-election period) 
In this section, we have retrieved and analyzed 1.000 tweets, prior to the EU election, 
with the hashtag #EUelection from various users. Then we did sentiment analysis as per 
below: 
 
Figure 6: Twitter sentiment scores: Positivity vs negativity last week prior to the election 
  
In figure 6 we do a comparison regarding the tweets mentioning the hashtag #EUelection, 
during the last week prior to the election. We can see that the situation is balanced with 
both positive and negative tweets, but we can draw a conclusion that all the extreme 
tweets (more than 0,4- either positive or negative) are mainly positive, an indication that 
users supported and participated to the election. 
 
4.1.1.3 1K (or less) tweets mentioning or replying to each leader  
In this section, we analyze 1.000 tweets mentioning the Twitter account of each leader 
prior to the EU election. The sentiment analysis is applied either in replies or retweets 
that comments on a leader’s tweet. 
• @ManfredWeber 
• @CiolosDacian 
• @ph_lamberts 
• @IratxeGarper 
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Manfred Weber 
1K tweets mentioning or replying to @ManfredWeber (18-24/05/2019) 
 
Figure 7: Twitter sentiment scores: Positivity vs negativity 
 
In figure 7 we may see the sentiment analysis -positivity versus negativity- of Manfred 
Weber prior to the election when users mentioned his name. It seems that the situation is 
balanced for the extreme positive or negative tweets (more than 0,6), while it is also bal-
anced in the middle of the chart. Furthermore, it is important to mention that while almost 
all positive mentions are ranged above 0,1 level, many of the negative are ranged near to 
0 and that maybe means that the majority of users do not use plenty of negativity in their 
tweets when mentioning Manfred Weber. 
 
 
Dacian Ciolos 
1K tweets mentioning or replying to @CiolosDacian (01/01- 23/05/2019) 
*Dacian Ciolos had 610 tweets mentioning his name during the pre-election period, an-
other clear sign that Twitter is not a social media platform that he bases many of his 
actions. 
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Figure 8: Twitter sentiment scores: Positivity vs negativity 
 
In figure 8 we may see that Dacian Ciolos extreme reactions are mainly positive. The rest 
mentions are balanced without any time pattern and we have the same situation as 
Manfred Weber with the negative mentions that approach 0 levels. 
 
Philippe Lamberts 
1K tweets mentioning or replying to @ph_lamberts (period: 10/04-24/05/2019) 
 
Figure 9: Twitter sentiment scores: Positivity vs negativity 
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As per figure 9, Philippe Lamberts seems to have a positive impact on his followers when 
they mention him or replying to his tweets. This conclusion is more obvious as the most 
extreme tweets are positive and only 3 mentions exceed the 0,6 level, while similarly with 
Manfred Weber and Dacian Ciolos negativity is mainly ranged between 0 and 0,2. 
 
 
 
 
Iratxe Garcia Perez 
1K tweets mentioning or replying to @IratxeGarper (period: 07-24/05/2019) 
 
Figure 10: Twitter sentiment scores: Positivity vs negativity 
 
In figure 10 we can see that Iratxe Garcia Perez has also a positive footprint on Twitter, 
taking into account the mentions and replies to her tweets. Although she is the only leader 
with so extreme tweets (reaching 1 in the ranking), only one of them is negative and if 
we do a comparison for the rest, their majority is also positive. 
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3.5.2 Facebook 
Dacian Ciolos 
 
Figure 11: a) Facebook comments, shares, overall reactions and b) separate reactions over 
time  
 
In figure 11a we may see that Dacian Ciolos is the leader who really dominates in all 
categories compared with the rest. Regarding the overall reactions, we can see that there 
is a high peak in May, the election month, as part of his social media strategy. During the 
rest period of time, there also some peak periods, but those should be related to his actions 
and the current affair. 
Regarding the separate reactions (11b), there is a logical progression of likes according 
to the popularity of the post and this is more intensive a few weeks prior to the election. 
Angry reactions are ranked in the 4th position and that means that much of his content 
creates negative reactions to his followers, although sometimes a post might refer to a 
negative fact, so the negative reaction applies for the fact and not the person. 
 
 
Comments Shares Reactions Likes Perfect Laugh Wow Sorry Angry 
Total 73.774 133.832 789.228 697.817 37.838 15.265 3.957 10.297 24.054 
Average 363,42 659 3.888 3.438 186 75,20 19,49 50,72 118,49 
Percentage 
  
100,00% 88,82% 5,16% 1,67% 0,46% 1,15% 2,74% 
Table 8: Dacian Ciolos Facebook totals 
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Iratxe Garcia Perez 
 
Figure 12: a) Facebook comments, shares, overall reactions and b) separate reactions over 
time 
 
In 12a we see that Iratxe Garcia Perez is the leader with the least impact and popularity 
on her Facebook posts. Nevertheless, in the above graph, we may see a small peak in 
reactions and shares the last week prior to the election, compared with the rest period of 
time. 
Similarly, with all posts from all leaders and Facebook users, likes are the leading cate-
gory, love follows, and all the rest are negligible. (12b) 
 
Table 9: Iratxe Garcia Perez Facebook totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Comments Shares Reactions Likes Love Laugh Wow Sorry Angry 
Total 455 2.594 10.323 8.724 1.259 4 23 160 153 
Average 5,29 30,16 120,03 101,44 14,64 0,05 0,27 1,86 1,78 
Percentage 
  
100,00% 84,51% 12,19% 0,06% 0,22% 1,54% 1,48% 
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Philippe Lamberts 
 
Figure 13: a) Facebook comments, shares, overall reactions and b) separate reactions over 
time 
Philippe Lamberts overall picture shows us a more linear pattern (13a), with small peaks 
arising repeatedly after specific time periods, with an exception over March when a huge 
peak took place.  
Similarly with the rest leaders (13b), “likes” is the leading category while the rest reac-
tions do not have any specific pattern either chronologically or quantitatively. 
 
Table 10: Philippe Lamberts Facebook totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments Shares Reactions Likes Love Laugh Wow Sorry Angry 
Total 3.811 9.653 25.280 20.895 1.950 204 246 296 1.688 
Average 33,14 85,42 219,83 181,70 16,96 1,77 2,14 2,57 14,68 
Percentage 
  
100,00% 82,65% 7,72% 0,81% 0,97% 1,17% 6,68% 
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Manfred Weber 
 
Figure 14: a) Facebook comments, shares, overall reactions and b) separate reactions over 
time 
 
In figure 14a we may comprehend that Manfred Weber is the only leader were comments 
overcome reactions in some of his posts (middle March to the beginning of April), a clear 
sign that his content causes conversations for various topics. After the beginning of April 
overall reactions becomes again the dominant category. 
Similarly with Philippe Lamberts, in 14b we see that separate reactions do not follow a 
specific pattern based on a social media strategy plan and all peaks that arise are not 
related to the election period. 
Table 11: Manfred Weber Facebook totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments Shares Reactions Likes Perfect Laugh Wow Sorry Angry 
Total 4.267 2.069 12.555 10.934 852 356 58 41 314 
Average 15,75 7,63 46,33 40,35 3,14 1,31 0,21 0,14 1,16 
Percentage 
  
100,00% 87,08% 6,79% 2,84% 0,47% 0,32% 2,50% 
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3.5.3 Comparative analysis 
Twitter 
 
Figure 15: a) Total and b) the average number of likes and re-tweets per leader on Twitter 
 
Figure 15a presents Twitter's total figures, likes, and re-tweets. Iratxe Garcia Perez and 
Manfred Weber lead likes and re-tweets categories respectively, but Perez has tweeted 
more times overall. Both of them increased their totals by the retweets that have been 
done. Concerning the 1k tweets with the hashtag #EUelection, 1 week prior to the elec-
tion, the engagement seems quite normal taking into account the total numbers of the 
leaders. 
Based on the total numbers and the total posts, in 15b we quote the averages of all figures. 
It is impressive that Dacian Ciolos leads the likes per tweet category, by tweeting only 29 
times prior to the election, while the rest leaders have at least twitted almost 600 times. 
This is a sign that users are engaged with his content, either positively or negatively. 
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Figure 16: a) Average sentiment scores for each leader’s tweet and #EUelection hashtag 
and b) average sentiment scores for each tweet mentioning each leader 
 
Regarding the sentiment analysis of the leaders (16a), we may see that Manfred Weber 
has the most positive speech, while Iratxe Garcia Perez and Philippe Lamberts lead in the 
negative. It is important to mention that deviations are minor in positivity and negativity 
and most of the tweets have been pointed as neutral. Sensibly, Weber also leads in the 
compound score, which confirms that has the most positive speech. Of course, it is clear 
that neutrality is by far the most dominant metric for all leaders and this is normal if we 
take into consideration that the majority of tweets refer to news/action announcements 
and general comments for various topics. 
 
In figure 16b we present the sentiment analysis of 1k tweets for each leader, by users 
mentioning their names. Similarly, with the previous graph Manfred Weber is the leader 
with the most positive impact on the user’s content, while it is interesting that at the same 
time, he is the one that receives the most negative content from users as well. This metric 
seems not normal but can be interpreted if we take into account that politicians have fa-
natic followers and haters that produce those results. 
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Foller.me17 
In this section, we present the Twitter statistics of each leader by using foller.me and we 
try to draw some useful conclusions. 
 
Figure 17: a) Total number of tweets, followers, following and b) tweets with mentions, 
tweets with hashtags, retweets, tweets with links, tweets with media 
 
In 17a we may comprehend the dominance of Manfred Weber in almost all categories, 
while Dacian Ciolos seems to be very “weak” in Twitter compared with the best leaders. 
In 17b, we can conclude that the situation is more balanced than the previous graph, where 
Dacian Ciolos was almost non-existent in most categories. Here, we can see that tweets 
with hashtags and media are ranged at the same level, while Manfred Weber leads the 
tweets with links category and Iratxe Garcia Perez the tweets with mentions and retweets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 www.foller.me 
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Facebook 
 
 
Figure 18: Total reactions, comments, and shares of each leader on Facebook 
In figure 18, we may see the total reactions, comments, and shares of all leaders during 
the pre-election period (1/1/2019 till 26/05/2019). The dominance of Dacian Ciolos is 
more than obvious in all categories, while the rest leaders are ranged in - less- the same 
level. This might be the result of sponsored posts, the 405k followers that he has on his 
Facebook page or a combination of both, as the difference with the rest leaders is tremen-
dous. 
 
 
Figure 19: a) Total number of separate reactions and b) the average number of total posts, 
reactions, comments and shares per leader on Facebook 
900.000 
800.000 
4.000 
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Of course, the same situation exists in figure 19b, where Ciolos reactions are ranged much 
higher than the rest leaders. 
In this graph, we can also see the ascendancy of Dacian Ciolos and it is interesting that 
he has posted few times than Manfred Weber who has done 66 more posts, but it is im-
portant to mention that Manfred Weber has 60k followers, almost 10 times less than Da-
cian Ciolos. 
 
 
Figure 20: a) Average numbers and b) average percentages of separate reactions on Fa-
cebook, per leader 
 
Following the totals, in 20a we present the separate reactions averages, while in 20b we 
provide a comparative analysis among the separate reactions percentages compared with 
the total, for each leader. We may observe that “likes” is the top category for all leaders, 
as expected, and Dacian Ciolos leads it. Furthermore, we can see that Iratxe Garcia Perez 
owns the top “perfect” percentage, a sign that her followers react very positively to her 
posts. Last, it is interesting that Philippe Lamberts leads the “angry” category percentage 
and we can give 2 interpretations. The first one is that the content of his post consists of 
hate speech and extreme opinions, while the second interpretation is that his posts reveal 
some bad strands of our society and the users react in such a way. We believe that the 
second interpretation accumulates the most possibilities. 
 
3.500 
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3.6 Fact-checking tools 
In the below section we present the results of the fact-checking tools research we have 
done for the 2019 EU election. 
The 1st part refers to the analysis of the fact-checked articles regarding the election and 
the 2nd part presents a websites credibility tool (newsguardtech18) which give us the ca-
pability to examine the accuracy and credibility (by checking various factors) of the web-
sites that publish the original articles that were fact-checked in the 1st part. Although t 
tool was not able to provide credibility results for all webpages, we present the results for 
the rest. 
This part of the thesis mainly covers the RQ3 (Chapter 3.1) and introduces some fact-
checking tools. 
3.6.1 Fact-checking websites analysis 
 
We collected 45 news articles related to misinformation in the EU election 2019 from the 
following fact-checking websites:  
• euvsdisinfo19 
• eufactcheck20 
• factcheckeu21 
 
Text analysis 
In this part, we observe that the words Russian, Russia, and Ukraine are shown in the top-
5 of the list and the words Moscow, Ukrainian complete the top-10, imprinting the clear 
implication of Russian/ Ukrainian malicious websites to the election. We used a text anal-
ysis tool (textalyser22), which analyzes the statistics of any given text. Our priority is to 
 
18 www. newsguardtech.com 
19 www.euvsdisinfo.eu/ 
20 www.eufactcheck.eu/ 
21 www.factcheckeu.info/en/ 
22 www.textalyser.net/ 
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explore and present any implication or pattern in the original texts of the examined arti-
cles. 
 
 
Word Occurrences Frequency Rank 
European 66 1.6% 1 
Russian 59 1.4% 2 
Russia 57 1.4% 2 
Ukraine 50 1.2% 3 
Elections 48 1.2% 3 
Church 34 0.8% 4 
Moscow 31 0.7% 5 
Report 27 0.7% 5 
Ukrainian 25 0.6% 6 
parliament 25 0.6% 6 
Table 12: Top frequency words in fact-checked articles 
 
 
Misinfo.me 
Below we may see the credibility evaluation results of each leader, based on the search 
and analysis that the tool has made. In order to graphically present the results of each 
leader, we proceed with a percentage ranking, based on the credibility element evaluation 
of the tool. More specifically, we rank each profile as per below: 
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Figure 21: Leaders Twitter profiles credibility 
 
In figure 21 we present the Twitter profiles credibility, based on the tool Misinfo.me. We 
can see that Philippe Lamberts has the most credible profile by using accurate sources, 
while Iratxe Garcia Perez is the leader with the least credible profile. 
 
a) 
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b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) 
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d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 20: Leaders credibility assessment from Misinfome. a) Manfred Weber, b) 
Philippe Lamberts, c) Dacian Ciolos and d) Iratxe Garcia Perez 
 
 
Figure 22: a) Twitter stats23 and b) sources credibility on Twitter, based on the website 
links used 
 
In figure 22a, we may see the Twitter statistics of each leader, as per the tool analysis and 
assessment. We may comprehend that Philippe Lamberts is the leader who accompanies 
his tweets with web links more than any other and that Dacian Ciolos is the one with the 
 
23 Web links in tweets compared with the total tweets 
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least Twitter activity, as he is more active on his Facebook account who dominates in 
almost all statistical categories. 
Regarding the sources credibility graph (22b), as already described above, Iratxe Garcia 
Perez seems to own the least credible profile as 13 non-credible web links have been 
found in her tweets, while Philippe Lamberts is the leader with the most credible web 
sources and leads this category. 
 
News Guard 
In table 14 we present the websites credibility results, based on the information from 
Newsguard. News- guard is a Google Chrome extension which evaluates the validity of 
any webpage that a user visit. Although the tool has some limitations, as it cannot provide 
results for all fact-checked articles websites, below we quote a comprehensive validation 
check for those web pages that most commonly publish fake news content. Also, we pre-
sent some web pages that have been flagged as valid and accurate in most categories and 
this is confirmed by the fact-checking results as well (APPENDIX A). Below the results: 
 
Website 
Credibility Transparency 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 T1 T2 T3 T4 
https://russian.rt.com/ X X ✔ X X ✔ ✔ ✔ X 
https://de.sputniknews.com/ X X X X X X ✔ ✔ X 
https://it.sputniknews.com/ X X X X X X ✔ ✔ X 
https://fr.sputniknews.com/ X X X X X X X ✔ X 
https://www.rt.com/ X X ✔ X X ✔ ✔ ✔ X 
https://deutsch.rt.com/ X X ✔ X X ✔ ✔ ✔ X 
https://www.liberation.fr/ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ X ✔ ✔ ✔ 
https://www.lemonde.fr/ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ X ✔ ✔ X 
Table 13: Credibility and transparency validation, per website  
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 Picture 21: Newsguard example 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Credibility and transparency separate figures, as per table 13 
 
Table 13 quotes the websites that the tool examines and provides the result for each cat-
egory. We can see that Liberation 24and Le monde 25are the most credible and trustworthy 
websites as they fulfill almost all requirements, while the rest websites can be character-
ized as non-credible as they have negative assessments for almost all categories.  
Table 14 consists of the unique attributes of credibility and transparency respectively. 
The credibility category contains 5 separate values, while the transparency contains 4. All 
of them are individually examined in order to provide the final assessment of each web-
site. 
 
 
24 www.liberation.fr 
25 www.lemonde.fr 
Credibility figures Transparency figures 
Does not repeatedly pub-
lish false content #C1 
Website discloses owner-
ship and financing #T1 
Gathers and presents infor-
mation responsibly #C2 
Clearly labels advertising 
#T2 
Regularly corrects or clari-
fies errors #C3 
Reveals who’s in charge, 
including any possible con-
flicts of interest #T3 
Handles the difference be-
tween news and opinion re-
sponsibly #C4 
The sites provides names 
of content creators, along 
with either contact or bio-
graphical information #T4 
Avoids deceptive headlines 
#C5 
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3.7 Discussion 
In this section, we provide a discussion of our findings and address some limitations of 
our research study. 
 
3.7.1 Plan/ strategy by the leaders 
We may see that while Iratxe Garcia Perez does not follow any specific plan or strategy, 
the curves of Philippe Lamberts seem to be related to the election date as the reaction 
curves are increased when the 26th of May approaches. Concerning Manfred Weber, we 
may comprehend from the sentiment analysis that his overall impact is mainly positive 
and as far as the reactions are concerned there are many regular peaks, which are either 
related to his strategy or the developments of the current affair. 
In Figure 27 we have done a sentiment for 1k tweets mentioning the hashtag #EUelection, 
prior to the election date. Although the positivity and negativity are balanced overall, the 
majority of the most extreme tweets are positive and that is a sign of users' participation 
and support to the procedure. 
 
3.7.2 Comparison 
The comparison graphs among leaders can assist us as well to draw some conclusions for 
the leaders. Regarding Twitter, we see that Dacian Ciolos leads the likes per tweet cate-
gory even with the least tweets compared with rest leaders, a clear sign that users are 
engaged with his content, either positively or negatively. 
The Twitter sentiment analysis graphs show that Manfred Weber has the most positive 
speech, while Iratxe Garcia Perez and Philipp Lamberts lead in the negative. Regarding 
the 1k tweets mentioning or replying to leaders' content, we also see that Manfred Weber 
has the most positive impact, but at the same time, he leads in the negative as well. Even 
if this metric seems not normal, we can interpret it by taking into account that politicians 
-normally- have fanatic supporters or haters. 
Regarding Facebook comparative analysis, it is interesting that while Dacian Ciolos dom-
inates in almost all categories, Manfred Weber has posted 66 more times than he did, but 
we should mention that Dacian Ciolos has about 10 times more followers that Manfred 
Weber and this is why they have such differences in the total figures. Also, likes are very 
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normally the top category for all leaders, but it is more interesting to focus on the perfect 
(love) or angry reactions as we can extract some useful insights. Iratxe Garcia Perez owns 
the top percentage of love reactions, while Philippe Lamberts leads the angry percentage 
category and concerning the angry reactions, 2 interpretations can be given. Either 
Philippe Lamberts content contains hate speech, or he reveals some negative facts of our 
society and users react in this way. We believe that the 2nd scenario concentrates most 
probabilities, as the generic online behavior does not show that he uses hate speech. 
 
3.7.3 Twitter 
Another research part related to Twitter is presented in the section and refers to 1k tweets 
mentioning or replying to each leader. More specifically the sentiment analysis of this 
part shows that Manfred Weber has a positive impact overall with equal amounts between 
positive and negative extreme mentions. It is very interesting and another clear sign that 
Dacian Ciolos is not so much engaged with Twitter, the fact that during the period 
01/01/2019- 25/05/2019 only 610 users mentioned him or replied to his tweets. 
3.7.4 Facebook 
Concerning Facebook, it is unambiguous that Dacian Ciolos dominates in all categories 
and his figures are at least 10 times greater than the rest leaders, while Iratxe Garcia Perez 
is the leader with the least impact on the platform. Another useful conclusion is that 
Manfred Weber is the only leader that comments overcome reactions in some posts from 
middle March until the beginning of April and that figure shows that his content provokes 
interest for conversation and interaction. 
3.7.5 Fact-checking  
In the fact-checking part, we did text analysis on the original articles of some websites 
that are related to the political reportage. All of them were fact-checked and most of them 
were either fake or partially fake. We found that the words Russian, Russia, and Ukraine 
were in the top-5 of the board and that shows the implication of Russian/ Ukrainian ma-
licious webpages on the EU election campaign.  
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Also, we examined the credibility of the leaders' Twitter profiles and found that Philippe 
Lamberts owns the most credible profile, while Iratxe Garcia Perez has the least credible, 
based on the sources and links that they have used. 
3.7.6 Limitations 
We are aware that our research may have some limitations. Many outcomes from News-
Guard tool were not available as it is restricted to English contents of the websites.  An-
other limitation is that for the data collection of tweets related to the European elections, 
we used only the #EUelection search term.  Furthermore, we admit that the collected data 
regarding misinformation in the European elections are limited to a small amount.  
Overall, we faced difficulties with the translations part, as all leaders mainly post and 
tweet in their mother language, except Manfred Weber who the one with the most Face-
book posts and tweets in English. Nevertheless, we manage to find applications that trans-
late text or files with a big amount of words. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The rapid spread of misinformation can influence millions of people, impacting elections 
and financial markets. Misinformation is seen as a serious problem across the globe in-
cluding Europe. There is no doubt that modern technologies have accelerated the speed 
at which fake news spread. 
In this thesis, we examined the concept of misinformation on the EU elections, 2019. We 
explored the Code of Practices published by the European Commission to address the 
spread of online misinformation and its compliance status with online platforms, leading 
social networks, and the advertising industry. 
Furthermore, we analyzed the social media profiles of the main political figures in the 
elections in terms of misinformation. More specifically, we studied what are the tactics 
used by the political carriers in order to attract people and get more votes in the election. 
We presented how social media campaigns were used by the European party leaders dur-
ing the last EU election 2019. 
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We investigated the previously fact-checked articles related to EU elections 2019 by us-
ing state-of-the-art and open-source fact-checking tools. We employ open source free 
tools. We also provide some analysis of fact-checking tools for tackling misinformation. 
  
We all may understand this major problem of our society can be confronted only by al-
tering our approach to the way that we receive, evaluate and then share or interact with 
the information. It is important to study the social aspects of misinformation in the context 
of behavioral sciences. We also encourage educational stakeholders to collaborate and 
create awareness about misinformation within the global community. 
 
Future research directions 
In the aforesaid discussion section, we described our research work limitations. To ad-
dress these research limitations, we propose some future research directions. To extend 
this study for the credibility assessment of non-English websites based on the availability 
of fact-checking tools having such functionality in the future. Further experimental tests 
are needed by enhancing the search queries with the combination of various hashtags 
related to elections. Our results are promising and should be validated by a larger size of 
previous assessment of news articles and claims on elections. 
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6 Appendices  
APENDIX A: Samples of Misinfo.me websites evaluation 
• https://russian.rt.com/  
 
 
 
• https://de.sputniknews.com/  
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• https://it.sputniknews.com/  
 
 
 
• https://fr.sputniknews.com/  
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• https://www.rt.com  
 
• https://deutsch.rt.com  
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• https://www.youtube.com  
 
 
 
 
• https://www.liberation.fr  
 
 
• https://www.lemonde.fr  
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